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Rereading de Man's Readings
Herman Rapaport
University

of Iowa

Reading de Man Reading, ed. Wlad Godzich, Lindsay Waters.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 312 pp.
Reading de Man Reading, edited by Wlad Godzich and Lindsay
Waters, contains distinguished essays on the critical theory of Paul de
Man; contributors include Geoffrey Hartman, Jacques Derrida,
Deborah Esch, Niel Hertz, Carol Jacobs, Peggy Kamuf, Kevin
Newmark, J. Hillis Miller, Werner Hamacher, Hans Robert Jauss,
Geoffrey Bennington, Bill Readings, Timothy Bahti, and Rodolphe
Gasche. All of the pieces except Hartman's were written before the
wartime writings of de Man were rediscovered, and therefore the
majority of the volume consists of essays that directly and indirectly
address de Man's writings from the 1960s on. Unfortunately, there is
no introductory essay that serves the purpose of outlining the major
phases of de Man's career or his central concepts, and therefore many
of the references and allusions made by various contributors will be
lost on those who are not already thoroughly familiar with de Man's
work. Especially the pieces by Hertz, Jacobs, Miller, Jauss,
Bennington, Newmark, and Gasche require that one closely examine
entire essays by de Man before attempting to follow the commentary.
Most specifically, anyone who engages Reading de Man Reading
will be required to re-examine de Man's most seminal article, "The
Rhetoric of Temporality," since many of the pieces either allude to its
structure, refer to its guiding terms, or reinscribe its argument in other
contexts. Given that requirement, I want to note a few of that essay's
major points before discussing some of the contributions to Reading
de Man Reading.
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We may recall that "The Rhetoric of Temporality" was
originally published in 1969 and that it is divided into two parts,
"Allegory and Symbol" and "Irony." Both parts correspond very
closely and can be seen as analogous to a two part musical invention.
In the first part, de Man demonstrates by comparative literary
analysis that during the 18th century the shift in rhetorical emphasis
from allegorization to symbolization did not occur without resistance. He demonstrates the point in the context of German, English,
and, finally, French literature. De Man argues that in Rousseau's
Julie ou la nouvelle Heloise the analogy between scene and emotion
is tightly joined thanks to the appearance of the symbol which brings
signifying elements into a simultaneous relation. In Rousseau, therefore, the text's naturalism and the contingency of temporal moments
are rendered symbolically, though in the very garden scenes where
such naturalism is constituted, de Man discovers an allegorical
register which resists naturalism and, instead, embraces very artificial conjunctions. These break with the sort of human perception that
would function as the enabling condition for symbolization and
naturalism: "The (allegorical' language is purely figural, not based on
perception, less still on an experienced dialectic between nature and
consciousness" (Blindness and Insight, 203). Whereas the symbol
holds a language of natural correspondences together, allegory
disrupts sensualistic correspondences even as it sets up a secondary
order of references which are not organically related. For de Man the
symbol brings entities into a spatial and simultaneous relation, while
allegory brings entities into a temporal and disjunctive relation.
Moreover, the symbol is assumed to be constative (passively reflecting what is always already given) while allegory is assumed to be performative (actively producing new meanings in a more or less ad hoc
manner). But this is not all. Symbols ensure narrative continuity,
while allegories ensure disjunctive iteration. Symbols therefore are
aligned with identity while allegories are aligned with difference. At
the close of "Symbol and Allegory" de Man will emphasize that
symbol and allegory are not, in fact, two different rhetorical orders but
that they are both aspects of the same rhetoric in whose conflict a
rearticulation of literature is brought about. Yet, there is irony in this
conflict. The impression of realist authenticity which the symbol conveys is, in fact, known to be a superficial illusion which betrays the
enlightenment of an earlier age that privileged allegory. Although
allegory is superseded by the symbol in the nineteenth century,
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol14/iss1/10
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writers ironically are unable to use symbols with "an entirely good
poetic conscience" (BI 208).
In part two, de Man alerts us to two manifestations of irony, the
one synthetic, the other disjunctive. This division of irony therefore
imitates the difference between symbol and allegory, suggesting the
musical structure of invention. The synthetic manifestation of irony
allows for consciousness to reconcile a number of conflicts and for
language to prevail over a subject's self-alienation. The disjunctive
manifestation of irony introduces an endless sequence of disjunct
moments which are never reconciled but infinitely repeated as the
repetition of what de Man calls a self-escalating act of consciousness.
Such irony "reveals the existence of a temporality that is definitely
not organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and
difference and allows for no end, for no totality" (BI 222). Yet,
although the performance of disjunctive irony and of allegory reveal a
similar temporal structure, that of iteration and difference, they are
dissimilar in that allegory extends or spreads out temporality while
irony compresses or condenses it. Still, irony and allegory are considered "two faces of the same fundamental experience of time" (BI
226).
Turning at the very end of the essay to Stendhal's La Chartreuse
de Parme, de Man notes that in Stendhal we have an instance in which
disjunctive novelistic moments are symptomatic of irony, though, at
the same time, one encounters slow meditative moments in which
allegory comes to appear. De Man concludes by citing an allegorical
emblem in place of an explanation. Stendhal's novel "tells the story of
two lovers who, like Eros and Psyche, are never allowed to come into
full contact with each other. When they can see each other they are
separated by an unbreachable distance; when they can touch, it has to
be in a darkness imposed by a totally arbitrary and irrational decision, an act of the gods" (BI 228). The irony of light and dark or of
disjunction and conjunction is very apparent in the allegory; yet, de
Man calls this the "allegory of irony," by which he means the way in
which irony is temporally extended if not subsumed by allegory. After
all, an ironic story is being used allegorically to gloss Stendhal's
novel. And yet, characteristic of de Man's thinking, such a position is
counterbalanced by the fact that if an ironic story is being subsumed
by allegory, this subsuming is itself so ironic that no one can say
allegory is entirely dominant.
Finally, there is one more twist to the screw: we should recall that
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for some time now nothing has been said about the symbol. Has it just
dropped out of sight? De Man for his part says nothing. But if we look
once more at the allegory of Psyche and Eros we will see that de Man
has played a clever trick on us. For it is the case that Psyche and Eros
are themselves figures which transform disjunctive allegorical relations into an expression of unity by means of a symbolic embrace.
Hence this symbolic embrace can be said to bring irony and allegory
into a relation or correspondence which is naturalized from a purely
human perspective. Although de Man does not explicitly point to a
sublation of the symbol, "The Rhetoric of Temporality" does end by
tacitly confirming the very historical understanding of symbolicity
from which it has taken distance-the view that during the preRomantic and Romantic periods there is a decisive shift to
symbolicity and ironization. In fact, if the symbol silently reasserts its
pre-eminence at the end of the essay, it is only because such a reassertion is itself highly ironic, given the fact that the argument of de Man's
essay is structured to preclude this very conclusion. Hence by
countering the familiar historical account of how symbol and irony

supplant allegory, de Man nevertheless reaffirms what has so successfully been destabilized, the subjugation of allegory by symbol and
irony.

Some of the contributors to Reading de Man Reading who have
strongly engaged "The Rhetoric of Temporality" include Timothy
Bahti, J. Hillis Miller, Carol Jacobs, Kevin Newmark, Rodolphe
Gasche, and Jacques Derrida. Indeed Jacobs, Bahti, and Miller come
quite close to broaching an organic theory of de Man's critical
development by highlighting the conceptual continuities between
"The Rhetoric of Temporality" and de Man's later work, as if de
Man's thought were extraordinarily developmental and all part of a
very systematized critical plan. Hillis Miller supports a view of such
de Manian master planning when he writes that "de Man is almost
certain to have been there before we arrive and to have anticipated
any 'deconstruction' of his own text we may perform" ( 168). Judging
from this, there is no critical insight we can have about de Man's texts
which he has not already seen and prepared us for. Consequently, no
move in de Man is merely accidental or random; each critical point is
strategically planned so that de Man's writings will carefully interlock
and form a highly rigorous interpretive network of correspondences.
Miller, Jacobs, and Bahti maintain this view as a means of paying
homage to a great thinker. Yet, as the essays in Reading de Man
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol14/iss1/10
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Reading reflect, the connections between de Man's sixties writings
and, say, Allegories of Reading, may not be quite so rigorous as one
might suppose. Gasche's essay on de Mani an "indifference" puts into
question some of the critical organicism promoted by other contributors, since Gasche is wondering whether de Man's later work
wasn't broaching the kind of non-referentiality which would have
been totally alien to de Man's essays in Blindness and Insight.
Derrida's piece, as well, destabilizes a genetic reading which would
establish continuity between "The Rhetoric of Temporality" and de
Man's later pieces. Derrida is suggesting that de Man's conception of
the speech act suggests a radical break with the earlier discriminations made between tropological devices like allegory, irony, and
symbol. The "event," production, or invention of de Manian criticism
is not reducible to the invention as device. That is, although de Man's
pieces have a tendency to contrapuntally superimpose themselves on
one another, they resist "invention" (as performance, device, but also
in the musical sense). Lastly, Kevin Newmark's focus on the
historical and the material makes one wonder whether de Man wasn't
ironically breaking with "The Rhetoric of Temporality" by means of
reinstating a certain naturalism. Exactly what the correspondences
are between de Man's earlier and later collections still needs further
clarification. In the individual essay reviews that follow we will notice
the extent to which the evaluation of de Man's critical legacy is quite
divided and unsettled.
In "Lessons of Remembering and Forgetting," Timothy Bahti
specifically focuses on "The Rhetoric of Temporality" in order to
make the point that the essay ought to be understood in relationship to
Martin Heidegger's thoughts on temporality, death, and forgetting.
Bahti's understanding of time in Heidegger is quite restricted; the
following gives us a good idea of how Bahti links Heidegger to de Man:

The mutation (by de Man] of Heideggerian temporality as beingtoward-death into a construal of understanding's temporality as
understanding-toward-death does not yield the "horizon" of a
horizon-of-expectations in the sense that such a spatialization of
the image (in Wordsworth's Lucy poems] might render it
knowable and therefore totalizable. . . Rather, temporality
takes the form of an anticipated horizon against which knowing is
partial, and its `collection' is only the deferred recollection of
what has actually been forgotten-death. According to this
.
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understanding, death is the condition for the meaningfulness of
temporal understanding of literature and its truth. (246-7)

Bahti's point is that in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" time is not
manifested in a symbol but rather in allegory which defers a complete
or totalized recovery of what has been forgotten, namely, death.
Allegory refuses coincidence, identification, or reification: "Allegory
at once reminds of what it is not-coincidence in time, with an
origin-and remembers this only in order to forget it .." (248). As
such, allegory "institutes tin its relation to irony] a sheer series of
recurrences that figures the forgetting or denial of these modes of
knowledge [nostalgia, desire, etc] in their conversion into either a
prefigured retrospective (allegorical) misunderstanding of irony or a
projective (ironic) transcendental misunderstanding of allegory"
(249). The notion of misunderstanding is quite crucial, because it
suggests that forgetting involves error. That is, in the repetition of "a
sheer series of recurrences" there is a "conversion" in which "forgetting" is characterized by "misunderstanding." Bahti's interpretation,
of course, is guided by a Derridean resistance to a rhetoric which
privileges presence, and "The Rhetoric of Temporality" is analyzed
in such a way that de Man appears as someone who was chiefly interested in "an unfull present" and who, like Derrida, was a step ahead of
Heidegger whose thinking was supposedly still caught in the grip of
metaphysics. According to Bahti, neither presence (life) nor absence
(death) can be constituted in a rhetoric of de Manian temporality,
except as displaced-momentarily situated in a tropology of remembering and forgetting.
Compared to what de Man actually writes in "The Rhetoric of
Temporality," Bahti's reading is revisionary, since de Man's point
about allegory and symbol was that they manifested different tropological formations which were mimetically in conflict. The sentence
by de Man which Bahti has in mind above reads as follows: "Whereas
the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification,
allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin,
and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference" (B! 207).
Nothing is being said about remembrance, forgetting, or death.
Rather, de Man is interested in how allegory "prevents the self from
an illusory identification with the non-self" (BI 207). Notice that de
Man's rhetoric hasn't even deconstructed the notion of the self. This is
.
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underscored by his remark in the next sentence that "It is this painful
knowledge [of the illusory identification I that we perceive at the
moments when early romantic literature finds its true voice" (BI 207.
Italics mine). Although the conceptual conditions are right for the
kind of rhetorical deconstruction which Bahti identifies, "The
Rhetoric of Temporality" does not really activate them in the way
Bahti suggests. At best, de Man's essay counterpoints symbol,
allegory, and irony in order to show that tropological formations are
not entirely complementary and that when brought into relation or
correspondence they harass our hermeneutical expectation that texts
disclose themselves as unified, homogeneous systems. What de
Man's essay demonstrates is that such a resistance to formalist consistency is historically determined by the erroneous way in which the
romantics themselves understood the relation between symbol and
allegory. To turn this into an implicit critique of Heidegger can always
be done, of course, though it should be said that this is alien if not
irrelevant to the aims of de Man's essay. The case for turning de Man
into a philosopher who has successfully critiqued the shortcomings of
Heidegger remains unconvincing.
J. Hillis Miller's "'Reading' Part of a Paragraph" also bears
closely on a reading of "The Rhetoric of Temporality," though Miller
is mainly interested in considering one of these moments in Allegories
of Reading where a critical condensation of thought takes place.
Since it is the tutor text of Miller's piece, I quote in full.

The paradigm for all texts consists of a figure (or a system of
figures) and its deconstruction. But since this model cannot be
closed off in a final reading, it engenders, in its turn, a supplementary figural superposition which narrates the unreadability of the
prior narration. As distinguished from primary deconstructive
narratives centered on figures and ultimately always on
metaphor, we can call such narratives to the second (or the third)
degree allegories. Allegorical narratives tell the story of the
failure to read whereas tropological narratives, such as the
Second Discourse, tell the story of the failure to denominate. The
difference is only a difference of degree and the allegory does not
erase the figure. Allegories are always allegories of metaphor
and, as such, they are always allegories of the impossibility of
reading-a sentence in which the genitive 'of' has itself to be
'read' as a metaphor. (Quoted in Miller, 156)
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According to Miller, de Man is insisting that we do not deconstruct
texts, but that figurally texts deconstruct themselves because of the
way in which-to take one example-metaphors are sedimented or
superimposed on one another. We are considering something like a
Freudian condensation in which disjunctions, contradictions, and
outright incompatibilities bring "aberrancy into the open" (158). As
de Man puts it, "A narrative endlessly tells the story of its own
denominational aberration and it can only repeat this aberration on
various levels of rhetorical complexity" (158). Miller points out that
for de Man the text's auto-deconstruction generates auxiliary
readings, each of which is aberrant. Miller's inference is that this autodeconstruction can already be seen in essays like "The Rhetoric of
Temporality" in so far as symbol, allegory, and irony tell the story of
their own denominational aberrations which they are compelled to
repeat. The way in which these tropological levels overlap would, for
the later de Man, make up allegorical registers. Hence one could
speak of second and third order narratives which "tell the story of the
failure to read" (161), the failure to generate homogeneous meaning
systems. The complexity of such contrapuntal superimpositions is
well reflected in Miller's astute observation:
The term 'degree' here is slightly odd, as is the addition in
parentheses of 'or the third.' By 'or the third' I suppose de Man
means that the deconstruction of the initially asserted figure or
system of figures could already be thought of as a second narrative superimposed on the first, so that the allegory of the failure to
read can be thought of as already a third narrative posited over
the first two, while if the positing of the figure and its deconstruction are thought of as a single story, then the allegory is only the
second narrative. (161)
But why does de Man use the word "allegory"? This is a question Miller wants to address, and not surprisingly it will lead him to
reconsider "The Rhetoric of Temporality." Miller points out that
for de Man allegory is always narrative and, as such, always
temporalized. Allegories are in a sign-sign relation, Miller says, while
symbols are in a sign-thing relation, and, as we noted above, allegory
is characteristic of distance and difference, while symbols are characterized by nearness and identification. In bringing these positions in
relation to the comments above from de Man's Allegories ofReading,
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol14/iss1/10
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Miller notes that when an allegorical sign repeats an earlier sign, it
also repeats "the error inscribed in that earlier sign, which was always
a figure or system of figures and its deconstruction" (162). Here
allegory is the carrier of the symbol, something already manifested in
de Man's emblem of Eros and Psyche at the end of "The Rhetoric of
Temporality."
Most interesting is Miller's following remark in which he links
the ending of "The Rhetoric of Temporality" to de Man's later understanding of a text's inability to read itself:

The error inscribed in the earlier sign is, however, repeated in the
allegorical sign in a blind form, that is, in the form of an unrecognizable difference, or in the form of a difference that can be recognized only by those who have the key to the allegory. In that
blindness, difference, and discrepancy between one part of the
text and another, along the temporal and narrative line, lies the
text's inability to read itself. (162-3)
Miller points out that in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" de Man said
the relation between an allegorical sign and its meaning was not
"decreed by dogma." The relation is not determined by any inherent
similarity between one sign and another, since "In allegory anything
can stand for anything" (163). And this raises the point (also made by
Gasche in his contribution to this volume) that de Man is concerned
with the indifference of signification which, in Miller's context, allows
for the reinscription and repetition of error in which "lies the text's
inability to read itself" (163). Miller, then, suggests that error or
blindness is a necessary consequence of 1) an allegorical temporality
which is fated to suggest faulty (because indifferent) correspondences and of 2) symbolic constructions which literalize or naturalize
aberrant connections. Allegory narrates the story of a text's inability
to read itself, while symbols manifest the impossibility of correct
denomination. As in "The Rhetoric of Temporality," allegory is performative, symbol constative. And again, as in "The Rhetoric of
Temporality," reading is necessarily viewed as an open ended process
in which no final determination of what a text means can be achieved,
since meaning is constituted in registers of signification which are so
closely aligned and subtly differentiated that meanings are held in a
curious proximity which like Eros and Psyche touch only under the
cover of blinding night.
Published by New Prairie Press
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Miller's expert reading of de Man suggests that whereas "The
Rhetoric of Temporality" considered the necessary relations of
incompatible figural and narrative structures which writers and critics
had naively dichotomized, Allegories ofReading took this approach
further by demonstrating that in such necessary relations the text is
destined to a transference of erroneous identifications and differentiations. Such transference, then, impedes the text from reading itself at
levels of figuration and narration. The interpreter, therefore, must not
be too optimistic about achieving an altogether satisfying reading,
since textual reconstructions will point to figural and narrative relationships which, strictly speaking, preclude textual readability.
Although "The Rhetoric of Temporality" is itself not so explicitly
pessimistic about how a text tells the story of its own unreadability, or
about the question of error or aberrance, one can see from Miller's
explanation how "The Rhetoric of Temporality" implicitly led de
Man to his later positions. In the correspondence between symbol and
allegory, for example, meanings are brought into erroneous conjunctions and a uniform reading or understanding of literature is
obstructed. Far from reinforcing each other's meanings, the tropological formations of the work conspire against synthesis.
In "Allegories of Reading Paul de Man," Carol Jacobs takes up
another approach to bringing the later and earlier de Man into relation. Jacobs suggests that de Man intended Allegories ofReading to
be superimposed on the structure of "The Rhetoric of Temporality"
and that de Man's major oeuvre was written as a series of complex
rhetorical reinscriptions that make up a kind of grand fugue. Jacobs'
focus is de Man's own narrative style, and she begins her analysis by
invoking what de Man had, in Allegories of Reading, once considered to be characteristic of symbolicity: the continuity of de Man's
own critical narrative as the "provisional syntheses that take place
along the way" (105). Given that "The Rhetoric of Temporality" is a
significant clue to de Man's narrative style, we should not be surprised that allegory is not far behind: "Side by side with these various
modes of suggesting linear progress through time one finds, equally
prevalent, a disconcerting insistence on the text as 'a series of repetitive reversals'
as a repetition of a pattern that ruptures dialectical progress" (106). But how can we account for the temporal contradictions between symbolicity and allegory in de Man's writings?
Specifically, "how does time play its role in the performance of de
Man's narrative" (106-7)? Jacobs argues, "time is that which marks
I

.

.

.
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the realization of the impossibility of self-definition" (107). In other
words, the rhetoric of temporality resists a linguistic essentialism and
broaches possibilities of uninterpretability. This point is crucial to
"The Rhetoric of Temporality" and in the context of Jacobs' essay
suggests that the writings of de Man are all based on his temporal
model.
Such a reading( or more precisely, meta-reading) assumes that de
Man's writings achieve an aesthetic or formal status akin to high art;
hence, de Man's criticism is being read as if it had the status of literature. This suggestion crops up in Jacobs' remark that in de Man's
work "time is, coincidentally, an act of transgressive freedom, a rupture, that marks the impossibility of textual definition and selfdefinition.
It acts out, then, both the promise of progress and its
failure, making promises it cannot fulfill in the present, making
excuses rather than confessions for that which it might rather expose
than hide, narrating endless fictions" (108). Is the temporality of de
Man's criticism itself the narration of an endless fiction about the
unreadability of literature? The suggestion is reinforced when Jacobs
acknowledges that de Man's commentary on Rousseau "forms something of a commentary on de Man's own style" (113), as if the difference between criticism and literature were under erasure in de
Man's work.
Jacobs' essay is quite illuminating in its demonstration of the
extent to which de Man's critical writings go out of their way to be selfreflexive. For example, she demonstrates that de Man's reading of
Narcisse et Pygmalion, which occurs in Allegories of Reading,
closely resembles the analysis of Stendhal in "The Rhetoric of
Temporality," since in Allegories the privileged scene turns on an
embrace strangely reminiscent of the Psyche and Eros myth. In
Allegories, however, the embrace is cited in Rousseau. Once again,
aporias of disjunction and conjunction come to the surface. So too do
the rhetorical features of irony, allegory, and symbol (though Jacobs
doesn't note them). Not surprisingly, this is followed by a commentary on "The Rhetoric of Temporality" in which we focus on de Man's
construction and deconstruction of the historical schemes which
legitimize his arguments. De Man's voice becomes so ironic, Jacobs
says, that "it demonstrates the impossibility of being historical"
(117). This means that the rhetorical self "rejects its own temporal
movement of correcting error to produce (illusory) wisdom and recognizes it or rather performs it as a problem that exists within the
.

.

.
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rhetoric of temporality. In speaking of other critics and other theories
of language, de Man necessarily spreads out along the axis of
imaginary time what is, in fact, simultaneous within his text" (117).
Jacobs call this the ironization of allegory, a term which complements the allegorization of irony at the end of "The Rhetoric of
Temporality." Literary history, Jacobs argues, is the temporality of a
rhetoric that vertiginously vacillates between irony and allegory.
Maybe she could have said that literary history is the symbol of this
vacillation. "Irony and allegory endlessly replace one another: this
trajectory can be read as a text engendering other, critical texts or as a
text reading itself, as a gain in critical knowledge or as an irresolvable
split and endless vacillation" (118). And time turns out to be an illusion created out of a "series of repetitive reversals" (118). This would
be hardly a satisfactory conclusion for anyone acquainted with
theories of temporality, for it rests on Jacobs' production of an
ahistorical mise en abyme which has swallowed time up. Whereas de
Man himself has been careful to counterpoint structures in ways that
both encourage reflexive crossings as well as dampen assumed correspondences, Jacobs' analysis eventually collapses into a whirlpool
of dizzying relationships which finally reduces temporality to mise en
abyme or mere vacillation.
Kevin Newmark, in "Paul de Man's History," considers the
rhetoric of temporality more squarely in historical materialist terms:
In the kind of move that has become habitual with de Man,
historical terms, then, turn out not to be really historical after all,
but rather are metaphors, and crude ones at that, for figural relationships. But if historical terms refuse to tell us about history and
end up being disguised as metaphors, then perhaps reading
metaphors will turn out to be our only reliable means of learning
something about history. (123)
In considering how de Man reads the tropes of Baudelaire's
"Correspondances," Newmark explores how metaphors and similes
delimit moments of conjunction and disjunction. Newmark seizes on
de Man's handling of the concept of figural transportation in
Baudelaire and recalls that two distinct realms are being suggested,
the aesthetic and the urban. "A reading that could disclose the urban
subway system lurking beneath the lyrical transports of symbolist
poetry would clearly be a first and important step in such a direction"
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(127), that direction being the understanding of how literature and
history interrelate. These two realms are brought into proximity
through the surprise that a literalization of figure or of "transports"
enables. What fascinates Newmark is how symbolic relations set up
the possibility of a literalization or concretization in which the
historical is situated more like an effect of signification rather than its
cause: "History is a linguistic event, the arrangement of verbal
buildings, a syntax of inscriptions that exists to be memorized and
then read" (133). One senses, again, that we are perhaps not so far
from the arguments of "The Rhetoric of Temporality." The figural or
verbal interplay ("correspondance") in Baudelaire would correspond fairly well to allegory while the liberalization of the figure
would relate to de Man's notion of the symbol which brings elements
into a simultaneous and concrete relation. For Newmark, the way in
which symbol and allegory are held in proximity by a trope which
elicits both literal and figural readings delimits the coming to appearance of history in poetic language. Yet, "these figures are merely the
incomplete narratives, or allegories, of a purely nonfigurative occurrence that remains beyond them and their pseudomovement, and
when they are read, such figures always and again tell the story of their
impossibility to occur historically" (134). In spite of this Newmark is
willing to talk about actual history: the repeated manifestation of
linguistic aporias. Newmark is not so far from recognizing that at best
one can bring signifying relations into correspondence which, as in
"The Rhetoric of Temporality," outline the trajectory of concrete
historical moments while, at the same time, demonstrating why
history is mimetically inaccessible. Because Newmark is pushing de
Man's tutor text, "Anthropomorphism and Trope in Lyric," further
than it actually wants to go, he ends up making the dubious claim that
terms like history, economics, and ideology are being rehabilitated by
de Man. Newmark's conclusion suggests that such notions are always
already under erasure and that they become significant only in relation to "incomplete narratives," "allegories," or a "nonfigurative
occurrence." Exactly what that means is not made clear, though
Newmark's footnotes suggest that we may find clues in the writings of
Walter Benjamin. That Newmark has not provided a detailed account
of how de Man read Benjamin and how that reading affects de Man's
understanding of history is disappointing. Certainly, Newmark's
piece touches on a very suggestive conjunction with Benjamin which
most commentators on de Man often miss.
Published by New Prairie Press
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Rodolphe Gasche's "In-Difference to Philosophy" once more
draws on the "symbol" / "allegory" distinction from "The Rhetoric
of Temporality" by counterpointing "rhetoric" to "philosophy."
Philosophy is the "discourse of difference" and rhetoric is the discourse of "self-affirmation." But just as philosophy reaches the
pinnacle of a discourse of difference in the work of Hegel, one finds a
"retrogression toward rhetoric" in figures like Friedrich Schlegel. De
Man is to some extent participating in this romantic retrogression:

Despite some major differences to be emphasized hereafter, Paul
de Man's linguistic or rhetorical reading of literature and
philosophy continues, in a certain manner, that romantic project
of dissolving the difference constitutive of both philosophy and
literature, philosophy and rhetoric. In the following analysis
devoted to de Man's reading of the philosophical texts of
Nietzsche, Kant, and Hegel, we will attempt to make this point.
(262)
More specifically, Gasche's insight will be that,

"A rhetorical reading, for de Man, is, indeed, a reading that seeks
the transgression of philosophical difference in an indifference
that is so radical as to become entirely indifferent-devoid of all
relation-to the philosophical." (262)
Although Gasche's intriguing essay is far too complex to summarize,
the following sentences from the close of his piece will give the reader
a good idea of how Gasche situates his thesis:
In short, the literary and the philosophical discourse are, for de
Man, meaningful enterprises involved in forgetting or recuperating the nonphenomenal properties of the material and formal act
of figuration, properties that come into view, as he insists,
through figuration itself, precisely to the extent in which figuration is itself a repetition of the originary violence of positing. All

there can be, consequently, is an endless series of acts of imposition that, because they lack all continuity with what precedes
them, repeat, without ever lending themselves to any real
discrimination, the 'original' arbitrary act of linguistic positing.
Ultimately, there is no difference between that act and the
authority of meaning. (289)
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Gasche is developing a point which has also been brought up in Hillis
Miller's essay, namely, that in de Man no ground supports the relation of one sign to another. For de Man linguistic relationships "just
happen," Miller says (163). Gasche discusses this, of course, in terms
of an indifference, of acts of linguistic imposition that lack any
inherent continuity. According to Gasche, de Man's project was never
to write on philosophy but to write in a way that was indifferent to it,
that refused to engage philosophy as a discourse of difference and in
so doing dismantled its fondest assumptions. That de Man's critical
writings did not occur in relation to philosophy is justified by his statement that "nothing
ever happens in relation, positive or negative,
to anything that precedes, follows, or exists elsewhere, but only as a
random event
." (293).
In its baldest sense such quotations give credence to those who
have dismissed deconstruction as a relativistic and ad hoc critical
approach. Moreover, one wonders why, if theory is reducible to some
kind of random event, de Man placed so much emphasis on critical
rigor. Indeed, one must wonder whether de Man fell into some kind of
very naive position or whether Gasche's decontextualization of de
Man's remarks is misleading. It ought to be noted, of course, that in
"The Rhetoric of Temporality" de Man did not champion a radical
view of the non-relationality of one sign to another; only much later do
we hear that "nothing
ever happens in relation
. to anything."
But why and how did de Man arrive at such a position? If one bothers
to read de Man's "Shelley Disfigured"-it is quoted by Gasche at the
end of his piece-, one will notice that it is in relation to Shelley's The
Thumph ofLife that de Man sights an aporia between the performative and the constative which comes to appearance as an iteration of
something that has no connection to what comes either before or after.
In Shelley, "the sun does not appear in conjunction with or in reaction
to the night and the stars, but of its own unrelated power" (The
Rhetoric of Romanticism, 116). How does Shelley simply posit the
sun? By what act of speech does the sun enter into the poem? "It can
only be because we impose, in our turn, on the senseless power of
positional language the authority of sense and of meaning" (RR, 117).
However, de Man says this is inconsistent, because if language can
posit (performatively) and mean (constatively), it "cannot posit
meaning" (RR, 117). The act of positing the sun and the act of
making it mean something belong to two different orders of expression which are not inherently bound. It is here that the arbitrary
.
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positing of the sun takes place even as the authority of sense and
meaning bears it away. But in this case, the arbitrary never serves as
ground; it is not privileged. Gasche seems to think otherwise: "His lde
Man's] radical empiricism-his stress on the arbitrariness, extreme
singularity, and impenetrable materiality of the linguistic acts and
signifier-appears to have gained such momentum here that its own
generality and universality turn into a radical challenge to the
generality of philosophical difference" (292). It would seem much
more appropriate to say that for de Man theory established and broke
correspondences in ways that disarticulate the limits of difference and
identity and that the logic of such a disarticulation is, far from absolutely random, brought into a necessary relational proximity with
texts in which the very notion of relationality is itself put into question
though not utterly annihilated.
Lastly, we should take into consideration Jacques Derrida's
"Psyche: Inventions of the Other," an essay which implicitly asks to
be allegorically superimposed on previous works by Derrida-for
example, "The Double Session," "Signeponge," "Limited Inc
abc . . . ," "Of An Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in
major importance
to Derrida's essay is a reconsideration of the performative/constative distinction which de Man invoked in Allegories ofReading. In the
chapter, "Rhetoric of Persuasion (Nietzsche)," de Man focused on
language as an event or speech act and demonstrates how the constative and the performative are brought into a chiastic relation which
breaks with the principle of contradiction: "The first passage in
Nietzsche] on identity showed that constative language is in fact performative, but the second passage tin Nietzsche] asserts that the possibility for language to perform is just as fictional as the possibility for
language to assert" (Allegories of Reading, p. 129). De Man
concludes, "the differentiation between performative and constative
language (which Nietzsche anticipates) is undecidable; the deconstruction leading from the one model to the other is irreversible but it
always remains suspended, regardless of how often it is repeated"
(A R,p. 130). One of de Man's final points, then, is that "Rhetoric is a
text in that it allows for two incompatible, mutually self-destructive
points of view, and therefore puts an insurmountable obstacle in the
way of any reading or understanding" (AR, p. 131).
It is noteworthy that in "Psyche: Inventions of the Other"
Derrida does not subscribe to the idea that deconstruction delimits the
1
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unreadability of a literary text. Rather for Derrida deconstruction
facilitates readability, a point he makes quite prominently at the end of
a section on Francis Ponge's "Fable":

Deconstruction is inventive or it is nothing at all; it does not settle
for methodical procedures, it opens up a passageway, it marches
ahead and marks a trail; its writing is not only performative, it
produces rules-other conventions-for new performativities
and never installs itself in the theoretical assurance of a simple
opposition between performative and constative. Its process
involves an affirmation, this latter being linked to the comingthe venire-in event, advent, invention. But it can only make it by
deconstructing a conceptual and institutional structure of invention that would neutralize by putting the stamp of reason on some
aspect of invention, of inventive power as if it were necessary,
over and beyond a certain traditional status of invention, to
reinvent the future. (42)

Here one can see the extent to which Derrida strongly breaks with
Paul de Man in Allegories of Reading. In place of a characterization
of deconstruction that stresses impasse, fatality, aporia, grid-lock,
impossibility, obstruction, aberrance, and uninterpretability, Derrida
views deconstruction as an act of invention, precipitation, broaching,
and unblocking. For Derrida deconstruction does not stall in the
double binds of the performative and the constative, but "involves an
affirmation," invokes a "coming," an "event," or "advent" that is
only neutralized by "the stamp of reason." Derrida's notion of invention is not that of de Man's mutually self-destructive points of view
which are allegorically fated to achieve a certain grid-lock or the
freezing up of the textual machinery; rather, Derrida wants to pursue
invention as a founding event or beginning which is always already
differed or deferred from what we might call the origin. Invention, for
Derrida, is a structure of conceptual relationships which have been
traditionally overstabilized by privileging the notion of device (invention as machine or method) and the priority of agency (the inventor).
The term "invention" binds a "technical order" to "metaphysical
humanism" (44). Inventions require patents, Derrida recalls, and for
an invention to be legitimized it must be stabilized or defined within a
certain institutional standing.
Although Derrida does not explicitly say so, the invention under
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discussion throughout this essay is "deconstruction" and Derrida is
implicitly interrogating how "deconstruction" can come to appearance as an institutionalized invention, method, or device or how he
himself can come to appearance as its inventor if the founding event
that is deconstruction radically breaks with institutionalized concepts
or statutes without which an invention cannot be recognized. How is
the performance of deconstruction as invention to be squared with its
institutionalized constative description as method or device?
In addition, there is another and more sensitive issue. Who has
invented deconstruction? Derrida or de Man? Or, is deconstruction
not an invention which can be set up in such an anthropomorphic
way? Is it not rather, like a musical invention, something which is constituted in the interweaving of various intellectual lines of thought?
When Derrida speaks of signatures and countersignatures and of
fathers and sons, he is, in fact, pointing out that inventions are always
signed for or appropriated by others. That is, deconstruction as a
linguistic event cannot be anything else but an "invention of the
other," of something countersigned by someone else. De Man has
appropriated Derrida, just as Derrida is now appropriating de Man.
And in this appropriative performance something gets invented,
something comes about, an event happens. This event, however, is
always already allegorical in that it is always in relation to an "other"
that an "invention" (in the sense of device, musical structure, founding event) is made, institutionalized, passed on, used, etc. In its
metaphysical sense, Psyche would stand for the mentality of this
invention, something akin to what one corporation calls "the mind of
Minolta," though for Derrida, of course, the notion of such a "mind"
is what is being critiqued.
Psyche, however, also refers us to the Eros and Psyche story
which de Man cites in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" and Derrida
complements that citation with a reading of "Fable" by Francis
Ponge in which the figure of Psyche is allegorically suggested as contemplating herself in a double sided mirror or "psyche." "But in
French a psyche, a homonym and common noun, is also a large
double mirror installed on a rotating stand. The woman, let us say
Psyche, her beauty or her truth, can be reflected there, can admire or
adorn herself from head to foot" (38-39). Derrida maintains that
"Fable" "puts into action the question of reference, of the specularity of language or of literature, and of the possibility of stating the
other or speaking to the other" (31). "Fable" takes place as an event
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which conflates both the performative (the productive, the transformative) and the constative ( the saying what is. the unveiling) and as
such bears on an "invention"-the double mirror, the allegory of
Psyche, the event that is the poem-which is radically unstable: "An
infinitely rapid circulation-such are the irony and the temporality of
this text-all at once shunts the performative into the constative, and
vice versa" (34). Noting the constative and performative valences of
the opening line to "Fable"-"Par le mot par commence donc ce
texte"-, Derrida concludes that
The infinitely rapid oscillation between the performative
and the constative, between language and metalanguage, fiction
and nonfiction, autoreference and heteroreference, etc.. does not
just produce an essential instability. This instability constitutes
that very event-let us say, the work-whose invention disturbs
normally, as it were, the norms, the statutes, and the rules. . . .
The fabulatory economy of a very simple little sentence,
perfectly normal in its grammar, spontaneously deconstructs the
oppositional logic that relies on an untouchable distinction
between the performative and the constative and so many other
related distinctions; it deconstructs that logic without disabling it
totally, to be sure, since it also needs it in order to detonate the
speech event. (34-35)
We recall that in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" allegory is performative, differentiating, and diachronic, while the symbol was constative, identifying, and synchronic. "Fable" could be said to make these
tropological conditions of language bear on the "invention" of language as an event that does not impede reading or obstruct interpretation, but that deconstructs without disabling, that deconstructs in
order to detonate the speech event. The mirror and the woman are but
the tropological effects of such a detonation though, at the same time,
they are the "double seance" which serves as the triggering
mechanism of "Fable." as the invention of the poem. Whereas in de
Man temporality manifests itself in the repetition and aberrance ofdifference, in Derrida's account temporality is situated in terms of that
which is coming, of the "event" which is being triggered in the redoubling of the psyche. Hence, just as the symbol is fractured or
broken-"Fable" itself refers to the shattering of the mirror-the
temporality of allegory is similarly wiped out by an anticipatory or
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apocalyptic moment of speech as event. Initiating, rupturing,
triggering, breaking open, the invention of a "Fable" broaches a
dissemination or efflorescence which can no longer be identified with
the impotent reading theory championed by de Man. In this division
the psyche of deconstruction is itself ruptured or fissured, its double
mirror triggering the device of a theory which cannot be reduced to a
patent, trademark, or corporate body. This, then, would be the "mind
of deconstruction."
Reading de Man Reading is certainly a very important collection of articles on the work of de Man, and it is unfortunate that space
does not permit commentary on the other very interesting essays.
Although not user friendly, the book will be very important for specialists in contemporary theory with an interest in de Man. Most interesting to me are the ways in which each writer countersigns for de
Man's theories and, in particular, the extent to which there is a wider
range of evaluations and interpretations than I would have otherwise
assumed. Indeed, the collection implicitly demonstrates that even
expert readers, all of them very sympathetic or at least receptive to de
Man, are still at an exploratory stage of interpretation; no rigid "party
line" has been established within this "school." Certainly, the wide
discrepancy between Hillis Miller's excellent close reading of de Man
and Derrida's powerful and multi-faceted meditation on "invention"
strikes me as symptomatic of the wide latitude of possibilities for
interpreting de Man's later work. In addition, the entire volume
reminds us that de Man's contributions to language and literary study
have been of such a high order of critical reflection that, in fact, the
recent revelations about de Man's wartime writings seem, for the
moment, quite overshadowed. At times one may even be seduced into
agreeing with Geoffrey Hartman that "de Man's critique of every
tendency to totalize literature or language, to see unity where there is
no unity, could be a belated, but still powerful, act of conscience"
(23).
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